They’ve modified the principles to make it simpler to steal bases. That’s not my conjecture. That’s simply the reality. By limiting the variety of pickoffs and setting a timer that baserunners can use to ascertain a rhythm, the sport has modified fully. Clearly, it has. You knew this. There have been 158 baserunners who tried to steal 10 or extra instances final season, up from 115 within the ultimate 12 months earlier than the rule adjustments. Most of them have been extremely profitable, too: These 158 stole at an combination 80.4% clip.
That’s not all that attention-grabbing, to be sincere. You knew it already. However what you won’t know? Three baserunners apparently didn’t get the memo. Ryan McMahon, Nicky Lopez, and Vidal Bruján all tried double digit steals and obtained thrown out greater than half the time. I needed to know extra, so I attempted to see what had gone incorrect for these three would-be thieves.
One factor I discovered immediately: Not each caught stealing may be pinned on the runner. This one, for instance, is simply an inherent threat of a double steal:
Gabriel Moreno is a superb defensive catcher, and he had this one sniffed out from the beginning. McMahon was useless to rights when he took off, and it’s much less about him not getting a adequate bounce and extra in regards to the deception required for a double steal. Possibly McMahon may have hit the turbo sooner, however to be sincere, he doesn’t have a whole lot of turbo; he was within the sixteenth percentile league-wide in dash velocity. Typically, the again runner of a double steal simply doesn’t survive.
I don’t imply to absolve him of all of the blame, although. I don’t even intend to absolve him of most of it. Take this steal, in a bandbox in Mexico Metropolis with the Rockies already trailing by two runs. This isn’t your common caught stealing:
This time, McMahon beat the throw clear. He simply couldn’t hold his physique on the bottom lengthy sufficient. It took replay – not my favourite method to catch somebody stealing – however that sloppy slide inarguably occurred. His entrance leg went fully airborne earlier than his path leg made contact with the bag, and gradual movement replays made it evident. Each caught stealing seems to be the identical in your statistical document, however this one, identical to the earlier one, doesn’t really feel as minimize and dry as “he can’t steal.”
Now this one? Yeah, don’t do that:
That was 4 days later. That’s terrible, to place it plainly. He simply misinterpret the scenario, took a incorrect step, and was executed. Then, after one other three days:
After that, McMahon principally didn’t attempt to steal for some time, apart from one memorable sprint dwelling. From Might 6 to July 13, he tried solely three steals and was profitable on all three. How did he break that profitable streak? With one I can’t even classify as a pickoff:
Ew. And oh yeah, his sixth and ultimate caught stealing of 2024:
OK, perhaps McMahon simply shouldn’t attempt to steal bases anymore.
McMahon’s lack of success appears to return all the way down to an incapacity to learn pitchers. However the different two gamers with low stolen base success charges went about their inefficiency in another way. Lopez and Bruján are within the majors due to their velocity and response time. Lopez as soon as stole 22 bases whereas getting caught solely as soon as – within the large leagues, with the previous guidelines. Bruján put up a 50-steal season within the minors. Is there something to be taught from watching speedsters fail?
Lopez’s first caught stealing got here in his second recreation of the season, however his try died a hero; it was a first-and-third, bait-the-throw scenario:
I do know it counts towards him on the again of his baseball card, however I don’t have an issue with this one, and I doubt the White Sox did both. His tried steal led on to a run. Many instances, catchers received’t throw by way of to second base with runners on the corners as a result of doing so provides the runner on third a greater probability to attain. That’s exactly why a runner on first base tries to steal in these conditions. If the catcher holds the ball, the runner on first will get into scoring place simply; if the catcher throws by way of, the runner on third in all probability scores. That’s precisely what occurred right here. The White Sox have been prepared to commerce an out for a run, and it fell on Lopez to do his half.
Lopez made a few of his outs the sincere manner, by making an attempt to steal and easily not being quick sufficient. In a six-day span, he obtained caught clear three completely different instances. Right here’s a consultant instance, the final of the three. As a reminder, don’t steal on Freddy Fermin. It’s by no means a superb signal when the pitcher begins celebrating earlier than the ball even reaches second base:
Now, that was a poor bounce, however these occur even to good base stealers. The issue for Lopez gave the impression to be that he misunderstood his personal velocity. I discussed that Lopez stole 22 bases in 2021, however he was a really completely different participant that 12 months. His common high velocity that 12 months was 28.2 ft per second. That dropped to 27.1 ft per second in 2024. And it’s not simply high velocity the place he’s fallen off, both. Statcast breaks down aggressive runs in 5-foot increments. Lopez took 2.86 seconds to run 60 ft in 2021; that was as much as 2.94 seconds in 2024, almost a tenth of a second distinction. His 45- and 50- foot splits declined by a proportional quantity. It won’t sound like a lot, however that’s the distinction in catcher pop time between an elite thrower and a mean one.
After that embarrassing begin – nobody likes their physique to inform them “buddy, you’re not quick sufficient anymore” – Lopez adjusted rapidly. The subsequent time he obtained caught stealing was almost two months later. Then he went almost one other two months earlier than getting caught once more, however this one was virtually definitely a blown hit-and-run:
Watch Lopez’s eyes, monitoring the play on the plate as a substitute of specializing in second. However there’s justice on the planet. Corey Seager’s eyes have been within the incorrect place, too, and he simply whiffed on a routine throw and catch. As a result of Lopez would’ve been out by a mile, that play goes within the e-book as a caught stealing with an E6, which allowed him to be protected. After that preliminary burst of precise factual caught stealings, Lopez recalibrated his personal velocity in his head, after which had an inexpensive success price. Excluding that blown hit-and-run, he tried seven steals the remainder of the 12 months and was profitable on 5 of them. More often than not, he didn’t even draw a throw. In different phrases, Lopez had a tough adjustment from quantity base stealer to opportunist, however after he re-taught himself the principles of the sport, he was completely acceptable on the basepaths once more.
That simply leaves Bruján in our quest for would-be base stealers who merely couldn’t do it. I’ve to confess, I used to be stunned to see his identify on this listing. An enormous a part of his prospect pedigree was that he stole bases in nice portions within the minors. However that’s previous information. Within the bigs, Bruján has stolen 14 bases and been caught 13 instances. His drawback mirrors Lopez’s. He’s simply not as quick as his psychological clock tells him he’s. On this play, the Marlins announcer minimize in with, “Large bounce!” to point out how a lot of a head begin Bruján obtained. Then he was out by a mile:
I slowed the GIF down somewhat bit across the time he realizes that this plan isn’t working so to see what went incorrect. What went incorrect is that he’s simply not quick sufficient. Elly De La Cruz, a base stealer of equally elite minor league pedigree, covers 45 ft in 2.23 seconds. Bruján is a tenth of a second slower. Over 60 ft, he’s 0.15 seconds slower. For those who’re on the lookout for some damning comparisons, Max Muncy and Brandon Lowe had the identical 45-foot splits. Splits aren’t every thing, they usually’re measured from dwelling to first in order that they aren’t an ideal comparability for what’s happening right here, however you may see on this replay that his burst isn’t what you’d anticipate for an elite speedster.
The reality of the matter is that Bruján simply doesn’t look like an ideal base stealer. Sure, he’s misplaced significant velocity within the large leagues; he used to have De La Cruz-esque burst. However even when he stole a ton of bases, he didn’t achieve this with nice effectivity. That fifty spot he put up within the minors? It got here with 19 instances caught stealing, a 74% success price, and in A-Ball at that.
I watched each one in every of Bruján’s stolen base makes an attempt to see whether or not he, like Lopez, altered his technique because the 12 months went on. He did – however by far lower than Lopez. He additionally overslid into an out and slid instantly at a couple of lunging tags. To make this out, Bruján each needed to get a nasty bounce after which fail to keep away from an especially tough, last-gasp tag try by Carlos Correa:
I assumed, after watching these instances the place Bruján obtained caught, that his profitable steals would look very comparable. He’d have a so-so bounce, however he’d simply barely beat out the throw. However that merely wasn’t the case. Right here’s a replay of his first steal of the 12 months:
The digicam didn’t pan to 3rd as a result of there was no level. Bruján had time to cease and take a selfie if he’d wished to. With that bounce, from that spot, and with that fumbled receiving try, there was no query of a detailed play.
Right here’s one other steal from the identical recreation:
Once more, Shea Langeliers had no probability. I’m unsure a bazooka would have sufficient oomph to get the ball to second on time there; Bruján had that one stolen by the point JP Sears completed his supply. This one, months later, was extra of the identical:
I didn’t even present the opposing battery as a result of they didn’t do something significant on this play. Bruján simply watched Drew Thorpe’s supply for 10 pitches, noticed a couple of pickoff makes an attempt, and sauntered to 3rd.
In reality, each single one in every of Bruján’s profitable steals got here with no throw. The brand new guidelines didn’t flip bang-bang outs into slim successes. They turned some iffy spots into simple, automated advances. In each single one in every of his uncontested successes, Bruján took benefit of pitchers’ hesitance to throw over and constant timing. He was significantly good at it from second. However each time he miscalculated and ended up with a contested probability, he made an out.
Even in immediately’s recreation, it’s doable to be dangerous at stealing. However the three worst base stealers, a minimum of by success price, from 2024? They failed in ways in which underscore how base stealing doesn’t work the way in which it used to anymore. Ryan McMahon? He simply can’t assist getting picked off. Nicky Lopez? He began the season working on every thing and simply wasn’t quick sufficient, so he needed to change his inside clock. Vidal Bruján? He blended collectively somewhat of every thing. However even these three would-be thieves, the three guys on the backside of the stolen base success price leaderboard, succeeded principally with uncontested steals. Nobody’s getting thrown out over and over on shut performs anymore. That’s simply not the way it works. As of late, base stealing is all about avoiding the simple outs. Oh, and it’s additionally about not getting picked off, by Aroldis Chapman of all individuals, if you’re not even making an attempt to steal. Take notes, Ryan.
